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Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is 
warranted. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative 
pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. We should distinguish between 
descriptive and normative realism because some arguments against scientific 
realism require that scientific realism be interpreted as descriptive realism, and 
because scientific realists can retreat from descriptive to normative realism 
when descriptive realism is under attack. We should also distinguish between 
descriptive and normative pessimism because some arguments against 
scientific pessimism require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism, and 
because scientific pessimists can retreat from descriptive to normative 
pessimism when descriptive pessimism is under attack. 
Keywords: No-Miracles argument – Pessimistic induction – Scientific realism – 
Scientific pessimism
1. Introduction 
Scientific realism and pessimism are opposing views about T, one of our best current 
theories. The literature presents descriptive and normative versions of scientific rea-
lism, which I call descriptive realism and normative realism, respectively. 
Descriptive realism holds that T is true,2 while normative realism holds that T is 
warranted. There are also descriptive and normative versions of scientific pessimism, 
which I call descriptive pessimism and normative pessimism, respectively. 
Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T 
is unwarranted. It is vitally important to distinguish between descriptive and 
normative realism, and between descriptive and normative pessimism.  
                                                        
1 I thank Mr. Jihee Han at UNIST and anonymous referees of this journal for useful comments. This 
work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Re-
search Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606). 
2 This paper drops ‘typically’ and ‘approximately’ for the sake of brevity. 
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I use the terms ‘descriptive pessimism’ and ‘normative pessimism’ instead of the terms 
‘descriptive antirealism’ and ‘normative antirealism’ for the following two reasons. First, 
descriptive pessimism and normative pessimism originate from the pessimistic induction as 
will become clear in Section 3. Second, ‘antirealism’ refers to any position that opposes 
realism. Thus, ‘antirealism’ refers not only to the positions that T is false and unwarranted, 
but also to the positions that T is empirically adequate, that it is warranted that T is 
empirically adequate, and so forth. So ‘antirealism’ is a more inclusive term than 
‘pessimism’. 
I undertake the following tasks in this paper. In Section 2, I point out that both descrip-
tive and normative realism can be found in the no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975).              
I argue that they have different capacities, that some objections to scientific realism depend 
upon scientific realism being descriptive realism, and that the downfall of descriptive rea-
lism does not necessarily mean the downfall of normative realism. In Section 3, I argue that 
there are descriptive and normative versions of the pessimistic induction (PI), and hence that 
there are also descriptive and normative pessimism. I show that descriptive pessimism is 
more vulnerable to attack from scientific realists than normative pessimism is. I argue that 
the consideration of the PI can lead to the distinction between descriptive and normative 
realism, and between descriptive and normative empiricism. In Section 4, I explicate how 
Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism 
relate to the aforementioned four positions. 
Anjan Chakravartty (2017) and Darrell Rowbottom (2017) present compre-   
hensive overviews of dialectical terrains concerning scientific realism. Such papers 
are useful to both new participants and veterans in the scientific realism debate. This 
paper, however, arises from the observation that these two survey articles do not 
distinguish between descriptive and normative realism, nor between descriptive and 
normative pessimism. The literature has neglected these distinctions, despite the fact 
that the scientific realism debate has been vigorous and voluminous for the past 
several decades. 
2. The No-Miracles Argument 
The no-miracles argument (NMA) is the most famous consideration for scientific rea-
lism (Sankey 2017, 201). This section aims to show that both descriptive and 
normative realism inhere in the NMA, and that some arguments regarding scientific 
realism only make sense under the interpretation that it is descriptive realism, and not 
under the interpretation that it is normative realism.  
There are successful theories in science, such as general relativity, evolutionary 
theory, and special relativity. Why are they successful? An answer can be found in 
Hilary Putnam’s NMA: 
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The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the 
success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this 
formulation is due to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are 
typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when 
it occurs in different theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not 
as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the success of 
science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its 
relations to its objects (Putnam 1975, 73).  
Descriptive realism is explicit in the last sentence of this passage. According to 
Putnam, scientific realism describes science. What about normative realism? It is 
implicit in the first sentence of the passage above. Putnam’s assertion that the 
successful performance of theories would be a miracle, if they were false, implies that 
it is unreasonable to believe that they are false, and that their successful performance 
would not be a miracle, if they were true, implies that it is reasonable to believe that 
they are true. To say that it is reasonable to believe that they are true is to be 
committed to normative realism. In sum, both descriptive realism and normative 
realism can be found in the NMA. 
How do descriptive and normative realism differ? A fundamental difference is 
that descriptive realism is capable of being true or false, whereas normative realism 
is not. Descriptive realism would be true if T is as descriptive realism holds it to be, 
i.e., if T is true, and false if T is not as descriptive realism holds it to be, i.e., if T is 
false. T is directly rendered true or false by the world. Consequently, descriptive rea-
lism is indirectly rendered true or false by the world. By contrast, normative realism, 
because it is a normative thesis, is not capable of being true or false. Even if T happens 
to be true, it is an open question whether it is warranted or not, as will become clear 
in the next section.  
A derivative difference between descriptive and normative realism is that the former 
can explain the success of T, but the latter cannot. It makes sense to say, for example, that 
the meta-hypothesis that T is true explains why T makes true predictions, i.e., it makes sense 
to say that T makes true prediction because it is true. By contrast, it is conceptually 
problematic to say that the meta-hypothesis that T is warranted explains why it makes true 
predictions, i.e., it is conceptually problematic to say that T makes true predictions because 
it is warranted. We should rather say that T is warranted, if at all, because it makes true 
predictions. Since descriptive realism and normative realism have different capacities, we 
should distinguish between them. 
The importance of distinguishing between descriptive and normative realism 
looms once we consider three famous objections to the NMA. The first famous 
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objection is that the NMA begs the question against the critics of abduction. The 
critics disbelieve that abduction is a reliable rule of inference. The NMA, however, 
relies on abduction, so it would not convince them. For this reason, Larry Laudan and 
Arthur Fine characterize the NMA, respectively, as “a monumental case of begging 
the question” (Laudan 1981, 45) and as “a paradigm case of ging the question” (Fine
1991, 82). 
These two philosophers start with the assumption that scientific realism is descriptive rea-
lism, which explains the success of T, and then contend that descriptive realism rests upon a 
circular argument. To say that descriptive realism is unwarranted means that T is unwarranted, 
which is exactly what normative pessimism affirms. Thus, Laudan and Fine set out to criticize 
descriptive realism and end up accepting normative pessimism. 
The second famous objection is that the NMA is undermined by alternative 
accounts of the success of T.3 Critics of the NMA might propose, for example, that the 
empirical adequacy of T accounts for its success (Ladyman 1999, 186), or that the 
behavior of observables accounts for the success of T (Mizrahi 2012, 137; Lyons 2018, 
147). These alternative explanations do not appeal to a miracle to explain the success 
of T. Thus, their existence undermines Putnam’s contention that scientific realism “is the
only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam 1975, 73).  
The critics of the NMA start with the assumption that scientific realism is 
descriptive realism, which explains the success of T, and then claim that descriptive 
realism is unwarranted due to the existence of the alternative hypotheses that do not 
appeal to the truth of T. To say that descriptive realism is unwarranted is to say that 
T is unwarranted, which is exactly what normative pessimism affirms. Thus, they set 
out to criticize descriptive realism and end up accepting normative pessimism.  
The third famous objection is that historical counterexamples undercut scientific 
realism (Laudan 1981, 47 – 48). The idea is that some false theories were successful, 
and these all run counter to the thesis that every successful theory is true. Lyons 
formulates this objection as follows: 
1. If (a) that realist meta-hypothesis were true, then (b) we would have no successful 
theories that cannot be approximately true. (If we did, each would be a “miracle,” 
which no one of us accepts.) 
2. However, (no-b) we do have successful theories that cannot be approximately true: 
the list (of “miracles”). 
3. Therefore, (no-a) the realist meta-hypothesis is false. (And the no-miracles argument 
put forward to justify that meta-hypothesis is unacceptable.) (Lyons 2016, 566) 
                                                        
3 See Park (2014) for a critical discussion of nine antirealist accounts. 
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This argument is a modus tollens. It has the same form as the following 
argument: If all apples were red, there would be no white apples, but there are some 
white apples; thus, it is false that all apples are red. In other words, white apples exist, 
and they are all counterexamples to the general statement that all apples are red. It 
follows that we should be agnostic about whether the next apples will be red. Laudan             
and Lyons’s argument is similarly intended to establish that we should be agnostic 
that current theories are true. Their argument is not intended to establish that current 
theories are false. For this reason, Park (2019a; Section 4.3) calls it the agnostic 
deduction. 
As far as I can tell, Laudan and Lyons start with the assumption that scientific 
realism is descriptive realism, and then contend that the historical counterexamples 
show that descriptive realism is false, i.e., that it is false that every successful theory 
is true. Thus, current theories might be true or might be false, and we do not know 
whether they are true or false, which means that they are unwarranted, and that is 
exactly what normative pessimism affirms. Therefore, we can say that Laudan         
and Lyons set out to criticize descriptive realism and end up accepting normative 
pessimism.  
Let me now turn to writers who take scientific realism to be normative realism. 
Timothy Lyons defines scientific realism as the view that “we can justifiably believe 
the hypothesis that successful theories are approximately true” (Lyons 2005, 171). 
Lyons (2016, 564; 2017, 1; 2018, 148) gives similar formulations of scientific rea-
lism. K. Brad Wray interprets Philip Kitcher’s (2001) scientific realism as claiming 
that “there is a strong connection between success and truth that warrants our belie-
ving that our successful theories are true” (Wray 2013, 1722). Thomas Nickles 
embraces non-realism, according to which we do not “have sufficient evidence and 
argument to conclude with confidence that even our most mature theories are true, or 
very nearly, that at best minor tweaking will be necessary” (2017, 151). Thus, Nickles 
would define scientific realism as the thesis that we have enough evidence to 
conclude so. These three philosophers’ formulations of scientific realism all come 
down to the suggestion that T is warranted, which is exactly what normative realism 
asserts. Thus, they would define scientific pessimism as the view that T is 
unwarranted, which is exactly what normative pessimism asserts. 
In line with Lyons, Wray, and Nickles are other philosophers, such as David 
Papineau (1996), Alan Musgrave (2017, 2018), and van Fraassen (2017). Papineau 
takes constructive empiricism to be the thesis that “we ought never to believe in the 
truth of any theory which goes beyond the observable phenomena” (1996, 8). Given 
that Papineau takes constructive empiricism to be a normative thesis, he would also 
take scientific realism to be the corresponding normative thesis that the belief of T is 
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reasonable. According to Musgrave, scientific realism asserts that “it is reasonable 
to believe that H is true” (Musgrave 2017, 80). Van Fraassen replies that “such              
a belief is reasonable enough, but supererogatory” (2017, 102). Note that both 
Musgrave and van Fraassen contend that the belief of H is reasonable. In sum, all 
these three philosophers would take scientific realism to be normative realism. 
It is conceptually problematic to suggest that T is successful because the belief 
of T is reasonable. As noted above, Lyons, Wray, Nickles, Papineau, Musgrave,      
and van Fraassen, take scientific realism to be normative realism. As a result, they 
would not say that scientific realism explains the success of T. If they happen to say 
so, however, we should interpret them as saying that descriptive realism explains the 
success of T. 
Earlier in this section, I introduced the three famous objections to descriptive 
realism. Recall that by attacking descriptive realism, the objectors all end up 
embracing normative pessimism. The demise of descriptive realism, however, does 
not ne-cessarily lead to normative pessimism, given that there are alternative 
positions, viz., normative realism and descriptive pessimism. An interesting question 
is whether the three objections count as convincing reasons for rejecting normative 
realism. Should we reject normative realism because the no-miracles argument is 
circular, because there are alternative accounts of the success of T, or because some 
successful theories were false in the history of science? This question can trigger 
interesting debates between normative realists and their opponents. Unfortunately, it 
would take us too far afield to stake out a position in this intriguing territory.  
This paper only offers an outline of how debates between normative realists and 
their opponents could unfold. Regarding the problem of circularity, normative realists 
could reply that new positive arguments for descriptive realism are introduced into 
the literature (Park 2018a, Section 3; 2018b, 57; 2018c, Section 3; 2019b, Section 3; 
2019c, Section 4, 2019d, Section 4).  
Such new arguments might amount to a defense of normative realism. Regarding 
the alternative accounts, normative realists could object that the alternative accounts 
are all problematic (Park 2014). Successful refutations of the alternative accounts 
would make normative realism promising. Regarding the agnostic deduction, they 
could argue that current theories are far more successful than their predecessors, so 
the falsity of the predecessors does not have enough power to make current theories 
unwarranted. All these contentions would be disputed by critics of normative realism. 
It would require, however, a lengthy digression to sketch the dialectic between them. 
This paper only needs the thesis that the demise of descriptive realism does not ne-
cessarily lead to the demise of normative realism. 
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3. The Pessimistic Induction 
The PI, another important argument in the realism debate, is the main consideration 
against scientific realism (Sankey 2017, 201). This section aims to show that there 
are descriptive and normative versions of the PI, which implies that there are descrip-
tive and normative pessimism. We should distinguish between descriptive and nor-
mative pessimism because normative pessimism is a safer position than descriptive 
pessimism.  
The descriptive PI holds that just as T1 was false, so T2 is false, where the former 
is a past theory and the latter is a present theory. This version of the PI can be inferred 
from Putnam’s formulation of the PI that “Just as no term used in the science of more 
than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used now 
(except maybe observational terms, if there are such) refers” (1978, 25). The descrip-
tive PI can also be inferred from Stathis Psillos’s formulation of the PI that “if most 
past successful scientific theories turned out to be false, then, by induction on scien-
tific theories, one must not just remain agnostic, but rather claim that current success-
ful scientific theories are likely to be false” (1995, 16). Keep in mind that the descrip-
tive PI asserts that T2 is false.  
In contrast, the normative PI holds that just as T1 was unwarranted, so T2 is 
unwarranted. The normative PI is neutral about the truth-value of T2. It says that T2
might be true, and that even though T2 is true, we cannot justifiably believe that it is 
true. No one has directly formulated the PI in this manner in the literature. It, how-
ever, can be inferred from James Ladyman’s formulation that “reflection on the aban-
donment of theories in the history of science motivates the expectation that our best 
current scientific theories will themselves be abandoned, and hence that we ought not 
to assent to them” (Ladyman 2014). To say that we ought not to assent to present 
theories is to say that T2 is unwarranted.  
Descriptive and normative pessimism can be found in the descriptive PI and the 
normative PI, respectively. Descriptive pessimism accords with the conclusion of the 
descriptive PI, and normative pessimism with that of the normative PI. In addition, 
descriptive pessimism is the pessimist counterpart of descriptive realism, and norma-
tive pessimism that of normative realism. 
Both the descriptive PI and the normative PI should be distinguished from the 
skeptical inference that since T1 was false, T2 is unwarranted. Recall that the descrip-
tive PI holds that since T1 was false, T2 is false. The premise and the conclusion are 
similar to each other in that they make definite claims about T1 and T2, respectively. 
Recall that the normative PI holds that since T1 was unwarranted, T2 is unwarranted. 
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reasonable. According to Musgrave, scientific realism asserts that “it is reasonable 
to believe that H is true” (Musgrave 2017, 80). Van Fraassen replies that “such              
a belief is reasonable enough, but supererogatory” (2017, 102). Note that both 
Musgrave and van Fraassen contend that the belief of H is reasonable. In sum, all 
these three philosophers would take scientific realism to be normative realism. 
It is conceptually problematic to suggest that T is successful because the belief 
of T is reasonable. As noted above, Lyons, Wray, Nickles, Papineau, Musgrave,      
and van Fraassen, take scientific realism to be normative realism. As a result, they 
would not say that scientific realism explains the success of T. If they happen to say 
so, however, we should interpret them as saying that descriptive realism explains the 
success of T. 
Earlier in this section, I introduced the three famous objections to descriptive 
realism. Recall that by attacking descriptive realism, the objectors all end up 
embracing normative pessimism. The demise of descriptive realism, however, does 
not ne-cessarily lead to normative pessimism, given that there are alternative 
positions, viz., normative realism and descriptive pessimism. An interesting question 
is whether the three objections count as convincing reasons for rejecting normative 
realism. Should we reject normative realism because the no-miracles argument is 
circular, because there are alternative accounts of the success of T, or because some 
successful theories were false in the history of science? This question can trigger 
interesting debates between normative realists and their opponents. Unfortunately, it 
would take us too far afield to stake out a position in this intriguing territory.  
This paper only offers an outline of how debates between normative realists and 
their opponents could unfold. Regarding the problem of circularity, normative realists 
could reply that new positive arguments for descriptive realism are introduced into 
the literature (Park 2018a, Section 3; 2018b, 57; 2018c, Section 3; 2019b, Section 3; 
2019c, Section 4, 2019d, Section 4).  
Such new arguments might amount to a defense of normative realism. Regarding 
the alternative accounts, normative realists could object that the alternative accounts 
are all problematic (Park 2014). Successful refutations of the alternative accounts 
would make normative realism promising. Regarding the agnostic deduction, they 
could argue that current theories are far more successful than their predecessors, so 
the falsity of the predecessors does not have enough power to make current theories 
unwarranted. All these contentions would be disputed by critics of normative realism. 
It would require, however, a lengthy digression to sketch the dialectic between them. 
This paper only needs the thesis that the demise of descriptive realism does not ne-
cessarily lead to the demise of normative realism. 
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3. The Pessimistic Induction 
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of the skeptical inference above dissimilar to each other in that the former makes         
a definite claim about T1, but the conclusion makes a skeptical claim about T2.  
This skeptical inference exemplifies skepticism about induction (Park 2019a, 
Section 4.2; forthcoming, Section 3). Humean skeptics reason, for example, that since 
some apples have fallen down, we do not know whether the next apple will fall down or 
not. Note that the premise of this skeptical inference makes the definite claim about some 
apples, but the conclusion makes a skeptical claim about the next apple. Humean skeptics 
reject, while scientific pessimists accept, the uniformity principle (Hume, 1888/1978, 89) 
that the future is similar to the past. So if a premise says that T1 was false, Humean skeptics 
infer that T2 is false, and if a premise says that T1 was unwarranted, they infer that T2 is 
unwarranted. 
Now that we are clear about the distinction between a pessimistic inference and 
a skeptical inference, we are ready to discuss the distinction between descriptive and 
normative pessimism. Why should we distinguish between descriptive and normative 
pessimism? Several objections were raised against scientific pessimism in the litera-
ture, and they require that scientific pessimism be interpreted as descriptive pess-
imism. It is worth examining them in detail one by one. 
Let me begin with a standard criticism against the descriptive PI. It asserts that T1
explains and predicts more phenomena than T2, so it is a fallacious inference that since T1
was false, T2 is also false (Musgrave 1985, 211; Devitt 2011, 292). Note that this criticism 
targets descriptive pessimism. In the face of this criticism, scientific pessimists tend to 
retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism, i.e., they tend to admit that T2 might be 
true, but maintain that T2 is unwarranted (Park 2019a, Section 4.2). On their account, the 
fact that T1 was false does not make T2 likely to be false, but makes T1 unwarranted. Their 
move indicates that descriptive pessimism is more susceptible to attack than normative 
pessimism. 
Another standard realist objection to the descriptive PI asserts that the PI com-
mits the fallacy called the fallacy of biased statistics (Fahrbach 2011; Park 2011; 
Mizrahi 2013). Pessimists provide a list of past theories to justify the premise of the 
descriptive PI. The list, however, favors distant past theories, e.g., the miasma theory, 
while failing to include any recent past theory, e.g., the kinetic theory. Note that this 
criticism also targets descriptive pessimism. In this face of this objection, scientific 
pessimists can retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism. Their retreat indi-
cates that normative pessimism is a safer position than descriptive pessimism. 
Consider also the following confrontation between descriptive realists and pes-
simists. Suppose that there are five successive theories of disease, T1, T2, T3, T4, and 
T5. T1 and T2 have been rejected, and T3 is currently accepted. Scientists will need to 
remove T3 and T4 before arriving at the true theory, T5. They, however, do not know 
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that they need to remove more theories before arriving at the true theory. Under such 
epistemic circumstances, descriptive pessimists would argue that scientists need to 
remove more theories, including T3, before obtaining the true theory, and hence that 
T3 is false. On their account, the demise of T1 and T2 does not make it likely that T3
is true. Descriptive realists, however, would retort that scientists have already re-
moved enough theories, so T3 is true. On their account, the demise of T1 and T2 makes 
it likely that T3 is true. Note that the more theories that have been discarded, the better 
it is for descriptive realism, and the fewer theories that have been discarded, the better 
it is for descriptive pessimism. We do not know whether the number of discarded 
theories is large enough to establish descriptive realism, or small enough to establish 
descriptive pessimism. Thus, we do not know whether the history of science favors 
descriptive realism or descriptive pessimism (Park 2019a, Section 3.1). 
This stalemate between descriptive realists and pessimists might motivate scien-
tific pessimists to retreat from the strong position that T3 is false to the weaker position 
that T3 is unwarranted. They admit that T3 might be true, but maintain that scientists are 
in the unfortunate epistemological situation in which they do not know that T3 is true. 
The gloomy history of science constitutes their reason for skepticism about current the-
ories (Park, 2019a: Section 4.2). Note that scientific pessimists are willing to give up 
descriptive pessimism, but not normative pessimism, which indicates that normative 
pessimism less vulnerable to attack than descriptive pessimism. Therefore, we should 
distinguish between them.  
The foregoing stalemate between descriptive realists and pessimists might also 
motivate scientific realists to retreat from the strong position that T3 is true to the 
weaker position that T3 is warranted. They admit that T3 might be false, but maintain 
that scientists are in the fortunate epistemological situation in which the history of 
science constitutes the reason for believing that T3 is true (Park 2019a, Section 4.2). 
The history of science is favorable to scientific realists because the demise of T1 and 
T2 makes it likely that T3 is true. On their account, scientists have made enough mis-
takes. Consequently, T3 is warranted. Note that scientific realists are willing to give 
up descriptive realism, but not normative realism, which indicates that it is harder to 
establish descriptive realism than normative realism. Therefore, we should distin-
guish between them.  
Finally, it is also useful to distinguish between descriptive and normative empiricism. 
Descriptive empiricism holds that T is empirically adequate, while normative empiricism 
holds that we are warranted in believing that T is empirically adequate. These two positions 
should be kept distinct, just as descriptive realism and normative realism should be kept dis-
tinct. There are some objections to descriptive empiricism. For example, a pessimistic induc-
tion asserts that since T’s precursor was empirically inadequate, T is also empirically ina-
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up descriptive realism, but not normative realism, which indicates that it is harder to 
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dequate (Park, 2018a: 337). In the face of this objection, empiricists might retreat from de-
scriptive empiricism to normative empiricism. I, however, leave to interested readers the task 
of fleshing out this line of thinking. 
4. Van Fraassen’s Definitions 
How does van Fraassen (1980) define scientific realism and constructive empiricism? 
How do his definitions of these rivaling positions relate to the definitions of descrip-
tive realism and pessimism, and to the definitions of normative realism and pessi-
mism?4
Van Fraassen’s (1980) definitions of the two rivaling positions are not about 
whether T is true or false, whether T is warranted or unwarranted, whether T is em-
pirically adequate or inadequate, or whether it is warranted or unwarranted that T is 
empirically adequate. They are rather about what science pursues, and what ac-
ceptance of T involves. Specifically, scientific realism holds that science “aims to 
give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance 
of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (van Fraassen 1980, 8). Con-
structive empiricism holds that science “aims to give us theories which are empiri-
cally adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empiri-
cally adequate” (van Fraassen 1980, 12).  
What does it mean to accept a theory? Van Fraassen answers that to accept            
a theory means to “confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual re-
sources of this theory” (van Fraassen 1980, 12). Thus, according to scientific realism, 
scientists believe that T is true when they use it to investigate the world. According 
to constructive empiricism, by contrast, scientists believe that T is empirically ade-
quate when they use it to investigate the world. This difference between the two ri-
valing positions is not well-appreciated in the literature. The two rivaling positions 
make different claims about what scientists believe with respect to T when they use 
it to investigate the world. 
What do the advocates of the two rivaling positions debate over? They debate over 
whether science has the goal to achieve true or empirically adequate theories, and over 
whether scientists believe that T is true or empirically adequate. Consequently, we should 
not expect that they would take positions on the issues of whether T is true or false, 
whether it is warranted or unwarranted, whether it is empirically adequate or inadequate, 
or whether it is warranted or unwarranted that T is empirically adequate.  
Van Fraassen can assert that T is unwarranted, and that T is empirically ade-
quate. When he makes such assertions, however, he is not a constructive empiricist. 
After all, the assertions are not entailed by the view that science “aims to give us 
                                                        
4 I thank a reviewer of this journal for this question. 
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theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as be-
lief only that it is empirically adequate” (van Fraassen 1980, 12). It is one thing to 
say that science seeks empirically adequate theories, and that scientists believe that T 
is empirically adequate when they use it to investigate the world. It is quite another 
to say that T is unwarranted, and that T is empirically adequate. An argument is re-
quired to make an inference from the former contentions to the latter contentions. 
5. Conclusion 
Rival philosophers construct various arguments against scientific realism and pessi-
mism in the literature. Some objections to scientific realism requires that it be inter-
preted as descriptive realism. These objections may prod scientific realists to retreat 
from descriptive to normative realism. Some objections to scientific pessimism also 
require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism. These objections may also prod 
scientific pessimists to retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism. Therefore, 
we should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism, and between de-
scriptive and normative pessimism.  
Which of the foregoing four views about T should the participants in the realism 
debate choose as their framework? The answer depends on what interests them. If 
they are interested in whether T is true, they should choose descriptive realism and 
pessimism as the framework of their debate. If they are interested in whether T is 
warranted, they should choose normative realism and pessimism as the framework of 
their debates. If they are interested in both, they may choose any of the four views. 
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